



## *Fourth GAIN World Conference*

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# *Initial Lessons Learnt from Manufacturers-Operator Sharing Programs*

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# *Structure of the Presentation*

- Introduction : The Remarkable Story of Risk
- Manufacturers - Operators Sharing Programs
- Lessons Learnt from Sharing Programs
- Towards Risk Management with Databases
- Conclusion : Initial Lessons for Proactive Safety

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# ***Introduction : Will It Remain Utopia ?***






# *Towards an Information Sharing Culture*



# *The Remarkable Story of Risk*






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
- Introduction : The Remarkable Story of Risk
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# *Manufacturer-Operator Sharing Schemes*






# *Manufacturer-Operator Sharing Programs*



## Concerning Voluntary Aircrew Incident Reporting

- AIRS to Promote Sharing of Operational Incidents
  - ASRs
  - and / or
  - HFRs
- Internal Sharing
- External Sharing




# *From Incident Data to Information with AIRS*


Pilots

Flight OPS Co-ordinator

DE-IDENTIFICATION

NARRATIVE REPORT




 **AIRS**  
ASR or HFR Questionnaire  
[Identification Slip](#)


[Reporting Form](#)

DATA


INFORMATION



# Towards Flight Operations Quality Assurance with LOMS



## Statistical reporting





## Flight replay





# For Manufacturer-Operator Sharing Programs



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## *Lessons Learnt from co-operating with airlines*


- Over the years, Airbus Industrie has been working with **a large customer base** on many urgent safety issues,
  - wind-shear,
  - volcanic ash,
  - smoke removal,
  - wake turbulence,
  - unreliable airspeed,
  - abnormal gear position,
  - dispatch reliability revisits,
  - A320 PIP interface improvement,
  - vertical navigation database management,
- This culture of sharing will open up to incident & event reporting if we can agree to **share some lessons learnt**,

## ***Lessons Learnt from co-operating with airlines***


- Stimulate confidential & multi-channel reporting:
  - train to enrich reporting context, causes & circumstances,
  - be aware of losing momentum if no timely feedback,
- Create conditions & processes for co-operative safety:
  - information sharing with “professional call-back” procedures,
  - Manufacturers & AA not to behave as Big Brother watching,
- Realize that for enriched Return of Experience:
  - it cannot be identical at airline and at manufacturers’ level,
  - liability experts should be integrated early on in the process,
- Aim to derive information from databases methodically:
  - by unveiling sense & order and by discovering precursors,
  - by assessing system redundancy & robustness of defences,



# Lessons : Combine Clinical & Statistical Analyses to Ask Intelligent Questions



# *Lessons : Stimulate LOMS with AIRS & vice-verca for more focus in FOQA !*



## *Lessons :*

### *Limitations of current analysis systems*

- Anonymity is of little value, confidentiality is fine with a range of appropriate security levels,
- Reporters often will produce biased reports,
- Reports often do contain safety assumptions bias,
- Data Bases contain subjective causal attribution, keyword limitations, self-fulfilling prophecies,
- Trend analyses show poor inter-analyst reliability,
- No follow-up, no feedback on safety assumptions,
- Mapping across taxonomies & databases may bias causality, stressing need for common tools,

## ***Lessons Learnt from sharing incident reporting***

- Focus on specific, well documented, high concern incidents,
- Invite airlines to identify specific precursors based on events,
- Standardize reports to aggregate statistics, scrutinize texts & coded categories for clear frequencies, build up base rate info,
- To measure safety performance, disregard all events for which guaranteed reporting cannot be assured to take place,
- Pool airline resources for experience if too scarce or no means,
- Train local analysts and give feedback on how coding impacts,
- Record all changes in design, procedures or training to track,
- Develop prevention strategies & verify applications & influence,
  - if clinical analyses fall short of contextual information, reviews of consequences from statistical analyses may still contribute,
  - CAST & JSSI are reviewing a range of intervention strategies in the realm of CFIT, ALAR, Loss of Control, Runway Incursion,



# ISO Screening for ARM/LOFU preparation

DATE <i>a/c, msn</i> OPERATOR	ATA chapter Phase	EVENT CODE	STRUCTURED EVENT NARRATIVE	ISRO ARM LOFU HF	OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
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Immediate Action

Identifying Precursors

Program CrossFertilisation

# What IF 's for preventive safety strategies!

## AIRCRAFT FIRE DURING REFUELLING

- Leaking Fuel bowser hose sprayed fuel on eng 2 hot section
- Fire erupted and engulfed RH MLG
- Tires burnt
- RH wing & engine severely damaged


## IMMEDIATE ACTION




OIT requested for information and recommend's after review of AMM05

## IDENTIFYING PRECURSORS

If a similar event were to occur




with passengers do we have



cockpit & cabin procedures ?

## CROSS-FERTILIZATION



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# ***Lessons :***

## ***Developing & Connecting Databases***

### ***Towards a top-down approach***

- **Identify risks to be monitored**
- **Explicate safety assumptions/strategies**
- **Explicate failure modes**
- **Explicate recovery modes**
- **Record corrective decision rationale**
- **Monitor corrections efficiency**
- **Amend safety assumptions accordingly**



# *Event Reporting Analysis & Safety Management*

## *Identify Risk Domains*



- Ground Collision (active runway)
- Runway excursion at take-off/landing
- Loss of control at take-off/initial climb
- CFIT/ initial climb /go-around
- Loss of control /climb/cruise/ approach
- CFIT/ climb/ cruise/approach
- In flight collision
- Uncontrolled fire in flight
- Severe turbulence
- Hard/crash landing

Incident

What risk?

Rationale

Trend

# *Event Reporting Analysis & Safety Management*

## *Challenge Implicit Safety Strategies*

File Edit Mode Level Risk Domain Precursor References Tools Help

AP design philosophy  
AP operation philosophy  
VMO/MMO exceedance procedure  
Warnings priority design  
VMO/MMO warnings design  
AP Disconnection warnings design  
ALT capture warnings  
Call out policy  
Training scenarios  
CRM principles  
Assumptions about warning detection  
...

- **Philosophies**
- **Policies**
- **Regulations**
- **Procedures**
- **Airmanship**
- **Assumptions about behavior of**
  - **organizations**
  - **teams**
  - **individuals**

# *Bringing to bear ERASM*

## *Links with raw incident data (1)*

.....  
**Warning detection assumption**

File	Edit	Description	Sort	Trend
Events Page				
Event Reference	Date			

**List of relevant events**

File	Edit	Events	Sort	Trend
Individual Event Description Page				
Reference	Date	Aircraft	Title	
Descriptive Factors				
Narrative				
Interpreted causal factors				

**Individual event data**

# *Bringing to bear ERASM*

## *Links with raw incident data (2)*

.....  
Crew will miss ALT warning ...

File	Edit	Description	Sort	Trend
Events Page				
Event Reference	Date			

List of relevant events

File	Edit	Events	Sort	Trend
Individual Event Description Page				
Reference	Date	Aircraft	Title	
Descriptive Factors				
Narrative				
Interpreted causal factors				

Individual event data



# *Bringing to bear ERASM*

## *Links with raw incident data (3)*

.....  
**ATC Controller will see ...**

File	Edit	Description	Sort	Trend
Events Page				
Event Reference	Date			

**List of relevant events**

File	Edit	Events	Sort	Trend
Individual Event Description Page				
Reference	Date	Aircraft	Title	
Descriptive Factors				
Narrative				
Interpreted causal factors				

**Individual event data**

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## ***Conclusion : Initial Lessons from Sharing***

- Safety Information is a dynamic field to be ploughed:
  - for testing defenses from revealing strengths & weaknesses,
  - for scrutinizing opportunities & threats with dedicated tools,
  - for evaluating risk exposure & distance to safety breakdowns,
  - for feedback on efficiency of corrective actions & safety strategies to manage defenses by protecting from precursors,
- Linking Databases mandates a Top-Down approach:
  - to explore, to review & to trace risk domains methodically,
- Return of Experience processes can work in earnest:
  - with both reactive & proactive data-driven analytical methods,
  - with decision trace-ability on corrective & preventive actions,
  - with economics in mind, adapting defenses as threats evolve,
  - with a “sharing culture” rather than a “compliance culture”.